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Computer-simulated scenarios have been part of psychological research on problem
solving for more than 40 years. The shift in emphasis from simple toy problems to
complex, more real-life oriented problems has been accompanied by discussions about
the best ways to assess the process of solving complex problems. Psychometric issues
such as reliable assessments and addressing correlations with other instruments have
been in the foreground of these discussions and have left the content validity of complex
problem solving in the background. In this paper, we return the focus to content issues
and address the important features that define complex problems.
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Succeeding in the 21st century requires many competencies, including creativity, life-long
learning, and collaboration skills (e.g., National Research Council, 2011; Griffin and Care, 2015),
to name only a few. One competence that seems to be of central importance is the ability to solve
complex problems (Mainzer, 2009). Mainzer quotes the Nobel prize winner Simon (1957) who
wrote as early as 1957:
The capacity of the human mind for formulating and solving complex problems is very small compared
with the size of the problem whose solution is required for objectively rational behavior in the real world
or even for a reasonable approximation to such objective rationality. (p. 198)
The shift from well-defined to ill-defined problems came about as a result of a disillusion with
the “general problem solver” (Newell et al., 1959): The general problem solver was a computer
software intended to solve all kind of problems that can be expressed through well-formed
formulas. However, it soon became clear that this procedure was in fact a “special problem solver”
that could only solve well-defined problems in a closed space. But real-world problems feature open
boundaries and have no well-determined solution. In fact, the world is full of wicked problems
and clumsy solutions (Verweij and Thompson, 2006). As a result, solving well-defined problems
and solving ill-defined problems requires different cognitive processes (Schraw et al., 1995; but see
Funke, 2010).
Well-defined problems have a clear set of means for reaching a precisely described goal state.
For example: in a match-stick arithmetic problem, a person receives a false arithmetic expression
constructed out of matchsticks (e.g., IV = III + III). According to the instructions, moving one of
the matchsticks will make the equations true. Here, both the problem (find the appropriate stick to
move) and the goal state (true arithmetic expression; solution is: VI= III+ III) are defined clearly.
Ill-defined problems have no clear problem definition, their goal state is not defined
clearly, and the means of moving towards the (diffusely described) goal state are not clear.
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For example: The goal state for solving the political conflict in
the near-east conflict between Israel and Palestine is not clearly
defined (living in peaceful harmony with each other?) and even
if the conflict parties would agree on a two-state solution, this
goal again leaves many issues unresolved. This type of problem is
called a “complex problem” and is of central importance to this
paper. All psychological processes that occur within individual
persons and deal with the handling of such ill-defined complex
problems will be subsumed under the umbrella term “complex
problem solving” (CPS).
Systematic research on CPS started in the 1970s with
observations of the behavior of participants who were confronted
with computer simulated microworlds. For example, in one of
those microworlds participants assumed the role of executives
who were tasked to manage a company over a certain period
of time (see Brehmer and Dörner, 1993, for a discussion of this
methodology). Today, CPS is an established concept and has even
influenced large-scale assessments such as PISA (“Programme
for International Student Assessment”), organized by the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD, 2014). According to the World Economic Forum, CPS
is one of the most important competencies required in the
future (World Economic Forum, 2015). Numerous articles on
the subject have been published in recent years, documenting the
increasing research activity relating to this field. In the following
collection of papers we list only those published in 2010 and
later: theoretical papers (Blech and Funke, 2010; Funke, 2010;
Knauff and Wolf, 2010; Leutner et al., 2012; Selten et al., 2012;
Wüstenberg et al., 2012; Greiff et al., 2013b; Fischer and Neubert,
2015; Schoppek and Fischer, 2015), papers about measurement
issues (Danner et al., 2011a; Greiff et al., 2012, 2015a; Alison
et al., 2013; Gobert et al., 2015; Greiff and Fischer, 2013; Herde
et al., 2016; Stadler et al., 2016), papers about applications (Fischer
and Neubert, 2015; Ederer et al., 2016; Tremblay et al., 2017),
papers about differential effects (Barth and Funke, 2010; Danner
et al., 2011b; Beckmann and Goode, 2014; Greiff and Neubert,
2014; Scherer et al., 2015; Meißner et al., 2016; Wüstenberg
et al., 2016), one paper about developmental effects (Frischkorn
et al., 2014), one paper with a neuroscience background (Osman,
2012)1, papers about cultural differences (Güss and Dörner, 2011;
Sonnleitner et al., 2014; Güss et al., 2015), papers about validity
issues (Goode and Beckmann, 2010; Greiff et al., 2013c; Schweizer
et al., 2013; Mainert et al., 2015; Funke et al., 2017; Greiff et al.,
2017, 2015b; Kretzschmar et al., 2016; Kretzschmar, 2017), review
papers and meta-analyses (Osman, 2010; Stadler et al., 2015), and
finally books (Qudrat-Ullah, 2015; Csapó and Funke, 2017b) and
book chapters (Funke, 2012; Hotaling et al., 2015; Funke and
Greiff, 2017; Greiff and Funke, 2017; Csapó and Funke, 2017a;
Fischer et al., 2017; Molnàr et al., 2017; Tobinski and Fritz, 2017;
Viehrig et al., 2017). In addition, a new “Journal of Dynamic
Decision Making” (JDDM) has been launched (Fischer et al.,
2015, 2016) to give the field an open-access outlet for research
and discussion.
1The fMRI-paper from Anderson (2012) uses the term “complex problem solving”
for tasks that do not fall in our understanding of CPS and is therefore excluded
from this list.
This paper aims to clarify aspects of validity: what should be
meant by the term CPS and what not? This clarification seems
necessary because misunderstandings in recent publications
provide – from our point of view – a potentially misleading
picture of the construct. We start this article with a historical
review before attempting to systematize different positions. We
conclude with a working definition.
HISTORICAL REVIEW
The concept behind CPS goes back to the German phrase
“komplexes Problemlösen” (CPS; the term “komplexes
Problemlösen” was used as a book title by Funke, 1986).
The concept was introduced in Germany by Dörner and
colleagues in the mid-1970s (see Dörner et al., 1975; Dörner,
1975) for the first time. The German phrase was later translated
to CPS in the titles of two edited volumes by Sternberg and
Frensch (1991) and Frensch and Funke (1995a) that collected
papers from different research traditions. Even though it looks as
though the term was coined in the 1970s, Edwards (1962) used
the term “dynamic decision making” to describe decisions that
come in a sequence. He compared static with dynamic decision
making, writing:
In dynamic situations, a new complication not found in the
static situations arises. The environment in which the decision
is set may be changing, either as a function of the sequence
of decisions, or independently of them, or both. It is this
possibility of an environment which changes while you collect
information about it which makes the task of dynamic decision
theory so difficult and so much fun. (p. 60)
The ability to solve complex problems is typically measured via
dynamic systems that contain several interrelated variables that
participants need to alter. Early work (see, e.g., Dörner, 1980)
used a simulation scenario called “Lohhausen” that contained
more than 2000 variables that represented the activities of a small
town: Participants had to take over the role of a mayor for a
simulated period of 10 years. The simulation condensed these ten
years to ten hours in real time. Later, researchers used smaller
dynamic systems as scenarios either based on linear equations
(see, e.g., Funke, 1993) or on finite state automata (see, e.g.,
Buchner and Funke, 1993). In these contexts, CPS consisted
of the identification and control of dynamic task environments
that were previously unknown to the participants. Different task
environments came along with different degrees of fidelity (Gray,
2002).
According to Funke (2012), the typical attributes of complex
systems are (a) complexity of the problem situation which is
usually represented by the sheer number of involved variables;
(b) connectivity and mutual dependencies between involved
variables; (c) dynamics of the situation, which reflects the role of
time and developments within a system; (d) intransparency (in
part or full) about the involved variables and their current values;
and (e) polytely (greek term for “many goals”), representing
goal conflicts on different levels of analysis. This mixture of
features is similar to what is called VUCA (volatility, uncertainty,
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complexity, ambiguity) in modern approaches to management
(e.g., Mack et al., 2016).
In his evaluation of the CPS movement, Sternberg (1995)
compared (young) European approaches to CPS with (older)
American research on expertise. His analysis of the differences
between the European and American traditions shows
advantages but also potential drawbacks for each side. He
states (p. 301): “I believe that although there are problems
with the European approach, it deals with some fundamental
questions that American research scarcely addresses.” So, even
though the echo of the European approach did not enjoy strong
resonance in the US at that time, it was valued by scholars like
Sternberg and others. Before attending to validity issues, we will
first present a short review of different streams.
DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO CPS
In the short history of CPS research, different approaches can be
identified (Buchner, 1995; Fischer et al., 2017). To systematize, we
differentiate between the following five lines of research:
(a) The search for individual differences comprises studies
identifying interindividual differences that affect the ability
to solve complex problems. This line of research is reflected,
for example, in the early work by Dörner et al. (1983) and
their “Lohhausen” study. Here, naïve student participants
took over the role of the mayor of a small simulated
town named Lohhausen for a simulation period of ten
years. According to the results of the authors, it is not
intelligence (as measured by conventional IQ tests) that
predicts performance, but it is the ability to stay calm in the
face of a challenging situation and the ability to switch easily
between an analytic mode of processing and a more holistic
one.
(b) The search for cognitive processes deals with the processes
behind understanding complex dynamic systems.
Representative of this line of research is, for example,
Berry and Broadbent’s (1984) work on implicit and explicit
learning processes when people interact with a dynamic
system called “Sugar Production”. They found that those
who perform best in controlling a dynamic system can
do so implicitly, without explicit knowledge of details
regarding the systems’ relations.
(c) The search for system factors seeks to identify the aspects of
dynamic systems that determine the difficulty of complex
problems and make some problems harder than others.
Representative of this line of research is, for example,
work by Funke (1985), who systematically varied the
number of causal effects within a dynamic system or the
presence/absence of eigendynamics. He found, for example,
that solution quality decreases as the number of systems
relations increases.
(d) The psychometric approach develops measurement
instruments that can be used as an alternative to classical IQ
tests, as something that goes “beyond IQ”. The MicroDYN
approach (Wüstenberg et al., 2012) is representative for this
line of research that presents an alternative to reasoning
tests (like Raven matrices). These authors demonstrated
that a small improvement in predicting school grade point
average beyond reasoning is possible with MicroDYN tests.
(e) The experimental approach explores CPS under different
experimental conditions. This approach uses CPS
assessment instruments to test hypotheses derived
from psychological theories and is sometimes used in
research about cognitive processes (see above). Exemplary
for this line of research is the work by Rohe et al. (2016),
who test the usefulness of “motto goals” in the context
of complex problems compared to more traditional
learning and performance goals. Motto goals differ from
pure performance goals by activating positive affect and
should lead to better goal attainment especially in complex
situations (the mentioned study found no effect).
To be clear: these five approaches are not mutually exclusive
and do overlap. But the differentiation helps to identify
different research communities and different traditions. These
communities had different opinions about scaling complexity.
THE RACE FOR COMPLEXITY: USE OF
MORE AND MORE COMPLEX SYSTEMS
In the early years of CPS research, microworlds started with
systems containing about 20 variables (“Tailorshop”), soon
reached 60 variables (“Moro”), and culminated in systems with
about 2000 variables (“Lohhausen”). This race for complexity
ended with the introduction of the concept of “minimal complex
systems” (MCS; Greiff and Funke, 2009; Funke and Greiff, 2017),
which ushered in a search for the lower bound of complexity
instead of the higher bound, which could not be defined as
easily. The idea behind this concept was that whereas the upper
limits of complexity are unbound, the lower limits might be
identifiable. Imagine starting with a simple system containing two
variables with a simple linear connection between them; then,
step by step, increase the number of variables and/or the type of
connections. One soon reaches a point where the system can no
longer be considered simple and has become a “complex system”.
This point represents a minimal complex system. Despite some
research having been conducted in this direction, the point of
transition from simple to complex has not been identified clearly
as of yet.
Some years later, the original “minimal complex systems”
approach (Greiff and Funke, 2009) shifted to the “multiple
complex systems” approach (Greiff et al., 2013a). This shift is
more than a slight change in wording: it is important because it
taps into the issue of validity directly. Minimal complex systems
have been introduced in the context of challenges from large-
scale assessments like PISA 2012 that measure new aspects
of problem solving, namely interactive problems besides static
problem solving (Greiff and Funke, 2017). PISA 2012 required
test developers to remain within testing time constraints (given
by the school class schedule). Also, test developers needed a
large item pool for the construction of a broad class of problem
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solving items. It was clear from the beginning that MCS deal with
simple dynamic situations that require controlled interaction: the
exploration and control of simple ticket machines, simple mobile
phones, or simple MP3 players (all of these example domains
were developed within PISA 2012) – rather than really complex
situations like managerial or political decision making.
As a consequence of this subtle but important shift in
interpreting the letters MCS, the definition of CPS became a
subject of debate recently (Funke, 2014a; Greiff and Martin, 2014;
Funke et al., 2017). In the words of Funke (2014b, p. 495):
It is funny that problems that nowadays come under the term
‘CPS’, are less complex (in terms of the previously described
attributes of complex situations) than at the beginning of
this new research tradition. The emphasis on psychometric
qualities has led to a loss of variety. Systems thinking
requires more than analyzing models with two or three
linear equations – nonlinearity, cyclicity, rebound effects,
etc. are inherent features of complex problems and should
show up at least in some of the problems used for research
and assessment purposes. Minimal complex systems run the
danger of becoming minimal valid systems.
Searching for minimal complex systems is not the same as
gaining insight into the way how humans deal with complexity
and uncertainty. For psychometric purposes, it is appropriate to
reduce complexity to a minimum; for understanding problem
solving under conditions of overload, intransparency, and
dynamics, it is necessary to realize those attributes with
reasonable strength. This aspect is illustrated in the next section.
IMPORTANCE OF THE VALIDITY ISSUE
The most important reason for discussing the question of
what complex problem solving is and what it is not stems
from its phenomenology: if we lose sight of our phenomena,
we are no longer doing good psychology. The relevant
phenomena in the context of complex problems encompass
many important aspects. In this section, we discuss four
phenomena that are specific to complex problems. We consider
these phenomena as critical for theory development and for
the construction of assessment instruments (i.e., microworlds).
These phenomena require theories for explaining them and
they require assessment instruments eliciting them in a reliable
way.
The first phenomenon is the emergency reaction of the
intellectual system (Dörner, 1980): When dealing with complex
systems, actors tend to (a) reduce their intellectual level by
decreasing self-reflections, by decreasing their intentions, by
stereotyping, and by reducing their realization of intentions, (b)
they show a tendency for fast action with increased readiness
for risk, with increased violations of rules, and with increased
tendency to escape the situation, and (c) they degenerate their
hypotheses formation by construction of more global hypotheses
and reduced tests of hypotheses, by increasing entrenchment, and
by decontextualizing their goals. This phenomenon illustrates
the strong connection between cognition, emotion, and motivation
that has been emphasized by Dörner (see, e.g., Dörner and Güss,
2013) from the beginning of his research tradition; the emergency
reaction reveals a shift in the mode of information processing
under the pressure of complexity.
The second phenomenon comprises cross-cultural differences
with respect to strategy use (Strohschneider and Güss, 1999;
Güss and Wiley, 2007; Güss et al., 2015). Results from complex
task environments illustrate the strong influence of context
and background knowledge to an extent that cannot be found
for knowledge-poor problems. For example, in a comparison
between Brazilian and German participants, it turned out that
Brazilians accept the given problem descriptions and are more
optimistic about the results of their efforts, whereas Germans
tend to inquire more about the background of the problems and
take a more active approach but are less optimistic (according to
Strohschneider and Güss, 1998, p. 695).
The third phenomenon relates to failures that occur during
the planning and acting stages (Jansson, 1994; Ramnarayan et al.,
1997), illustrating that rational procedures seem to be unlikely to
be used in complex situations. The potential for failures (Dörner,
1996) rises with the complexity of the problem. Jansson (1994)
presents seven major areas for failures with complex situations:
acting directly on current feedback; insufficient systematization;
insufficient control of hypotheses and strategies; lack of self-
reflection; selective information gathering; selective decision
making; and thematic vagabonding.
The fourth phenomenon describes (a lack of) training and
transfer effects (Kretzschmar and Süß, 2015), which again
illustrates the context dependency of strategies and knowledge
(i.e., there is no strategy that is so universal that it can
be used in many different problem situations). In their own
experiment, the authors could show training effects only for
knowledge acquisition, not for knowledge application. Only with
specific feedback, performance in complex environments can be
increased (Engelhart et al., 2017).
These four phenomena illustrate why the type of complexity
(or degree of simplicity) used in research really matters.
Furthermore, they demonstrate effects that are specific for
complex problems, but not for toy problems. These phenomena
direct the attention to the important question: does the stimulus
material used (i.e., the computer-simulated microworld) tap and
elicit the manifold of phenomena described above?
Dealing with partly unknown complex systems requires
courage, wisdom, knowledge, grit, and creativity. In creativity
research, “little c” and “BIG C” are used to differentiate
between everyday creativity and eminent creativity (Beghetto
and Kaufman, 2007; Kaufman and Beghetto, 2009). Everyday
creativity is important for solving everyday problems (e.g.,
finding a clever fix for a broken spoke on my bicycle), eminent
creativity changes the world (e.g., inventing solar cells for energy
production). Maybe problem solving research should use a
similar differentiation between “little p” and “BIG P” to mark
toy problems on the one side and big societal challenges on
the other. The question then remains: what can we learn about
BIG P by studying little p? What phenomena are present in
both types, and what phenomena are unique to each of the two
extremes?
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ON METHODS
Discussing research on CPS requires reflecting on the field’s
research methods. Even if the experimental approach has been
successful for testing hypotheses (for an overview of older work,
see Funke, 1995), other methods might provide additional and
novel insights. Complex phenomena require complex approaches
to understand them. The complex nature of complex systems
imposes limitations on psychological experiments: The more
complex the environments, the more difficult is it to keep
conditions under experimental control. And if experiments have
to be run in labs one should bring enough complexity into
the lab to establish the phenomena mentioned, at least in
part.
There are interesting options to be explored (again): think-
aloud protocols, which have been discredited for many years
(Nisbett and Wilson, 1977) and yet are a valuable source
for theory testing (Ericsson and Simon, 1983); introspection
(Jäkel and Schreiber, 2013), which seems to be banned from
psychological methods but nevertheless offers insights into
thought processes; the use of life-streaming (Wendt, 2017),
a medium in which streamers generate a video stream of
think-aloud data in computer-gaming; political decision-making
(Dhami et al., 2015) that demonstrates error-proneness in groups;
historical case studies (Dörner and Güss, 2011) that give insights
into the thinking styles of political leaders; the use of the critical
incident technique (Reuschenbach, 2008) to construct complex
scenarios; and simulations with different degrees of fidelity (Gray,
2002).
The methods tool box is full of instruments that have to
be explored more carefully before any individual instrument
receives a ban or research narrows its focus to only one paradigm
for data collection. Brehmer and Dörner (1993) discussed the
tensions between “research in the laboratory and research in the
field”, optimistically concluding “that the new methodology of
computer-simulated microworlds will provide us with the means
to bridge the gap between the laboratory and the field” (p. 183).
The idea behind this optimism was that computer-simulated
scenarios would bring more complexity from the outside world
into the controlled lab environment. But this is not true for all
simulated scenarios. In his paper on simulated environments,
Gray (2002) differentiated computer-simulated environments
with respect to three dimensions: (1) tractability (“the more
training subjects require before they can use a simulated task
environment, the less tractable it is”, p. 211), correspondence
(“High correspondence simulated task environments simulate
many aspects of one task environment. Low correspondence
simulated task environments simulate one aspect of many task
environments”, p. 214), and engagement (“A simulated task
environment is engaging to the degree to which it involves and
occupies the participants; that is, the degree to which they agree
to take it seriously”, p. 217). But the mere fact that a task is called a
“computer-simulated task environment” does not mean anything
specific in terms of these three dimensions. This is one of several
reasons why we should differentiate between those studies that do
not address the core features of CPS and those that do.
WHAT IS NOT CPS?
Even though a growing number of references claiming to deal
with complex problems exist (e.g., Greiff and Wüstenberg,
2015; Greiff et al., 2016), it would be better to label the
requirements within these tasks “dynamic problem solving,” as
it has been done adequately in earlier work (Greiff et al., 2012).
The dynamics behind on-off-switches (Thimbleby, 2007) are
remarkable but not really complex. Small nonlinear systems that
exhibit stunningly complex and unstable behavior do exist –
but they are not used in psychometric assessments of so-
called CPS. There are other small systems (like MicroDYN
scenarios: Greiff and Wüstenberg, 2014) that exhibit simple
forms of system behavior that are completely predictable and
stable. This type of simple systems is used frequently. It is
even offered commercially as a complex problem-solving test
called COMPRO (Greiff and Wüstenberg, 2015) for business
applications. But a closer look reveals that the label is not used
correctly; within COMPRO, the used linear equations are far
from being complex and the system can be handled properly
by using only one strategy (see for more details Funke et al.,
2017).
Why do simple linear systems not fall within CPS? At the
surface, nonlinear and linear systems might appear similar
because both only include 3–5 variables. But the difference
is in terms of systems behavior as well as strategies and
learning. If the behavior is simple (as in linear systems
where more input is related to more output and vice versa),
the system can be easily understood (participants in the
MicroDYN world have 3 minutes to explore a complex
system). If the behavior is complex (as in systems that
contain strange attractors or negative feedback loops), things
become more complicated and much more observation is
needed to identify the hidden structure of the unknown
system (Berry and Broadbent, 1984; Hundertmark et al.,
2015).
Another issue is learning. If tasks can be solved using
a single (and not so complicated) strategy, steep learning
curves are to be expected. The shift from problem solving to
learned routine behavior occurs rapidly, as was demonstrated
by Luchins (1942). In his water jar experiments, participants
quickly acquired a specific strategy (a mental set) for solving
certain measurement problems that they later continued applying
to problems that would have allowed for easier approaches.
In the case of complex systems, learning can occur only on
very general, abstract levels because it is difficult for human
observers to make specific predictions. Routines dealing with
complex systems are quite different from routines relating to
linear systems.
What should not be studied under the label of CPS are pure
learning effects, multiple-cue probability learning, or tasks that
can be solved using a single strategy. This last issue is a problem
for MicroDYN tasks that rely strongly on the VOTAT strategy
(“vary one thing at a time”; see Tschirgi, 1980). In real-life, it is
hard to imagine a business manager trying to solve her or his
problems by means of VOTAT.
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WHAT IS CPS?
In the early days of CPS research, planet Earth’s dynamics and
complexities gained attention through such books as “The limits
to growth” (Meadows et al., 1972) and “Beyond the limits”
(Meadows et al., 1992). In the current decade, for example,
the World Economic Forum (2016) attempts to identify the
complexities and risks of our modern world. In order to
understand the meaning of complexity and uncertainty, taking
a look at the worlds’ most pressing issues is helpful. Searching
for strategies to cope with these problems is a difficult task:
surely there is no place for the simple principle of “vary-one-
thing-at-a-time” (VOTAT) when it comes to global problems.
The VOTAT strategy is helpful in the context of simple problems
(Wüstenberg et al., 2014); therefore, whether or not VOTAT is
helpful in a given problem situation helps us distinguish simple
from complex problems.
Because there exist no clear-cut strategies for complex
problems, typical failures occur when dealing with uncertainty
(Dörner, 1996; Güss et al., 2015). Ramnarayan et al. (1997)
put together a list of generic errors (e.g., not developing
adequate action plans; lack of background control; learning from
experience blocked by stereotype knowledge; reactive instead
of proactive action) that are typical of knowledge-rich complex
systems but cannot be found in simple problems.
Complex problem solving is not a one-dimensional, low-level
construct. On the contrary, CPS is a multi-dimensional bundle
of competencies existing at a high level of abstraction, similar
to intelligence (but going beyond IQ). As Funke et al. (2018)
state: “Assessment of transversal (in educational contexts: cross-
curricular) competencies cannot be done with one or two types
of assessment. The plurality of skills and competencies requires a
plurality of assessment instruments.”
There are at least three different aspects of complex systems
that are part of our understanding of a complex system: (1) a
complex system can be described at different levels of abstraction;
(2) a complex system develops over time, has a history, a current
state, and a (potentially unpredictable) future; (3) a complex
system is knowledge-rich and activates a large semantic network,
together with a broad list of potential strategies (domain-specific
as well as domain-general).
Complex problem solving is not only a cognitive process but
is also an emotional one (Spering et al., 2005; Barth and Funke,
2010) and strongly dependent on motivation (low-stakes versus
high-stakes testing; see Hermes and Stelling, 2016).
Furthermore, CPS is a dynamic process unfolding over time,
with different phases and with more differentiation than simply
knowledge acquisition and knowledge application. Ideally, the
process should entail identifying problems (see Dillon, 1982;
Lee and Cho, 2007), even if in experimental settings, problems
are provided to participants a priori. The more complex and
open a given situation, the more options can be generated (T. S.
Schweizer et al., 2016). In closed problems, these processes do not
occur in the same way.
In analogy to the difference between formative (process-
oriented) and summative (result-oriented) assessment (Wiliam
and Black, 1996; Bennett, 2011), CPS should not be reduced to the
mere outcome of a solution process. The process leading up to the
solution, including detours and errors made along the way, might
provide a more differentiated impression of a person’s problem-
solving abilities and competencies than the final result of such
a process. This is one of the reasons why CPS environments are
not, in fact, complex intelligence tests: research on CPS is not only
about the outcome of the decision process, but it is also about the
problem-solving process itself.
Complex problem solving is part of our daily life: finding the
right person to share one’s life with, choosing a career that not
only makes money, but that also makes us happy. Of course,
CPS is not restricted to personal problems – life on Earth gives
us many hard nuts to crack: climate change, population growth,
the threat of war, the use and distribution of natural resources. In
sum, many societal challenges can be seen as complex problems.
To reduce that complexity to a one-hour lab activity on a random
Friday afternoon puts it out of context and does not address CPS
issues.
Theories about CPS should specify which populations they
apply to. Across populations, one thing to consider is prior
knowledge. CPS research with experts (e.g., Dew et al., 2009) is
quite different from problem solving research using tasks that
intentionally do not require any specific prior knowledge (see,
e.g., Beckmann and Goode, 2014).
More than 20 years ago, Frensch and Funke (1995b) defined
CPS as follows:
CPS occurs to overcome barriers between a given state and
a desired goal state by means of behavioral and/or cognitive,
multi-step activities. The given state, goal state, and barriers
between given state and goal state are complex, change
dynamically during problem solving, and are intransparent.
The exact properties of the given state, goal state, and barriers
are unknown to the solver at the outset. CPS implies the
efficient interaction between a solver and the situational
requirements of the task, and involves a solver’s cognitive,
emotional, personal, and social abilities and knowledge. (p. 18)
The above definition is rather formal and does not account
for content or relations between the simulation and the real
world. In a sense, we need a new definition of CPS that addresses
these issues. Based on our previous arguments, we propose the
following working definition:
Complex problem solving is a collection of self-regulated
psychological processes and activities necessary in dynamic
environments to achieve ill-defined goals that cannot
be reached by routine actions. Creative combinations of
knowledge and a broad set of strategies are needed. Solutions
are often more bricolage than perfect or optimal. The
problem-solving process combines cognitive, emotional,
and motivational aspects, particularly in high-stakes
situations. Complex problems usually involve knowledge-rich
requirements and collaboration among different persons.
The main differences to the older definition lie in the emphasis
on (a) the self-regulation of processes, (b) creativity (as opposed
to routine behavior), (c) the bricolage type of solution, and (d) the
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role of high-stakes challenges. Our new definition incorporates
some aspects that have been discussed in this review but were not
reflected in the 1995 definition, which focused on attributes of
complex problems like dynamics or intransparency.
This leads us to the final reflection about the role of CPS
for dealing with uncertainty and complexity in real life. We will
distinguish thinking from reasoning and introduce the sense of
possibility as an important aspect of validity.
CPS AS COMBINING REASONING AND
THINKING IN AN UNCERTAIN REALITY
Leading up to the Battle of Borodino in Leo Tolstoy’s novel “War
and Peace”, Prince Andrei Bolkonsky explains the concept of
war to his friend Pierre. Pierre expects war to resemble a game
of chess: You position the troops and attempt to defeat your
opponent by moving them in different directions.
“Far from it!”, Andrei responds. “In chess, you know the
knight and his moves, you know the pawn and his combat
strength. While in war, a battalion is sometimes stronger than a
division and sometimes weaker than a company; it all depends
on circumstances that can never be known. In war, you do not
know the position of your enemy; some things you might be able
to observe, some things you have to divine (but that depends on
your ability to do so!) and many things cannot even be guessed
at. In chess, you can see all of your opponent’s possible moves. In
war, that is impossible. If you decide to attack, you cannot know
whether the necessary conditions are met for you to succeed.
Many a time, you cannot even know whether your troops will
follow your orders. . .”
In essence, war is characterized by a high degree of
uncertainty. A good commander (or politician) can add to that
what he or she sees, tentatively fill in the blanks – and not just
by means of logical deduction but also by intelligently bridging
missing links. A bad commander extrapolates from what he sees
and thus arrives at improper conclusions.
Many languages differentiate between two modes of
mentalizing; for instance, the English language distinguishes
between ‘thinking’ and ‘reasoning’. Reasoning denotes acute
and exact mentalizing involving logical deductions. Such
deductions are usually based on evidence and counterevidence.
Thinking, however, is what is required to write novels. It is
the construction of an initially unknown reality. But it is not
a pipe dream, an unfounded process of fabrication. Rather,
thinking asks us to imagine reality (“Wirklichkeitsfantasie”). In
other words, a novelist has to possess a “sense of possibility”
(“Möglichkeitssinn”, Robert Musil; in German, sense of
possibility is often used synonymously with imagination even
though imagination is not the same as sense of possibility, for
imagination also encapsulates the impossible). This sense of
possibility entails knowing the whole (or several wholes) or being
able to construe an unknown whole that could accommodate
a known part. The whole has to align with sociological and
geographical givens, with the mentality of certain peoples or
groups, and with the laws of physics and chemistry. Otherwise,
the entire venture is ill-founded. A sense of possibility does not
aim for the moon but imagines something that might be possible
but has not been considered possible or even potentially possible
so far.
Thinking is a means to eliminate uncertainty. This process
requires both of the modes of thinking we have discussed thus
far. Economic, political, or ecological decisions require us to
first consider the situation at hand. Though certain situational
aspects can be known, but many cannot. In fact, von Clausewitz
(1832) posits that only about 25% of the necessary information
is available when a military decision needs to be made. Even
then, there is no way to guarantee that whatever information
is available is also correct: Even if a piece of information was
completely accurate yesterday, it might no longer apply today.
Once our sense of possibility has helped grasping a situation,
problem solvers need to call on their reasoning skills. Not every
situation requires the same action, and we may want to act
this way or another to reach this or that goal. This appears
logical, but it is a logic based on constantly shifting grounds: We
cannot know whether necessary conditions are met, sometimes
the assumptions we have made later turn out to be incorrect, and
sometimes we have to revise our assumptions or make completely
new ones. It is necessary to constantly switch between our sense
of possibility and our sense of reality, that is, to switch between
thinking and reasoning. It is an arduous process, and some people
handle it well, while others do not.
If we are to believe Tuchman’s (1984) book, “The March of
Folly”, most politicians and commanders are fools. According
to Tuchman, not much has changed in the 3300 years that
have elapsed since the misguided Trojans decided to welcome
the left-behind wooden horse into their city that would end up
dismantling Troy’s defensive walls. The Trojans, too, had been
warned, but decided not to heed the warning. Although Laocoön
had revealed the horse’s true nature to them by attacking it with
a spear, making the weapons inside the horse ring, the Trojans
refused to see the forest for the trees. They did not want to listen,
they wanted the war to be over, and this desire ended up shaping
their perception.
The objective of psychology is to predict and explain human
actions and behavior as accurately as possible. However, thinking
cannot be investigated by limiting its study to neatly confined
fractions of reality such as the realms of propositional logic,
chess, Go tasks, the Tower of Hanoi, and so forth. Within
these systems, there is little need for a sense of possibility. But
a sense of possibility – the ability to divine and construe an
unknown reality – is at least as important as logical reasoning
skills. Not researching the sense of possibility limits the validity
of psychological research. All economic and political decision
making draws upon this sense of possibility. By not exploring
it, psychological research dedicated to the study of thinking
cannot further the understanding of politicians’ competence and
the reasons that underlie political mistakes. Christopher Clark
identifies European diplomats’, politicians’, and commanders’
inability to form an accurate representation of reality as a reason
for the outbreak of World War I. According to Clark’s (2012)
book, “The Sleepwalkers”, the politicians of the time lived in their
own make-believe world, wrongfully assuming that it was the
same world everyone else inhabited. If CPS research wants to
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make significant contributions to the world, it has to acknowledge
complexity and uncertainty as important aspects of it.
CONCLUSION
For more than 40 years, CPS has been a new subject of
psychological research. During this time period, the initial
emphasis on analyzing how humans deal with complex, dynamic,
and uncertain situations has been lost. What is subsumed under
the heading of CPS in modern research has lost the original
complexities of real-life problems. From our point of view, the
challenges of the 21st century require a return to the origins of
this research tradition. We would encourage researchers in the
field of problem solving to come back to the original ideas. There
is enough complexity and uncertainty in the world to be studied.
Improving our understanding of how humans deal with these
global and pressing problems would be a worthwhile enterprise.
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